

Shangen Li

Contact Information

Department of Economics
University of Zürich
Blümlisalpstrasse 10
8006, Zürich

Homepage: <https://shangen.li>
Email: work@shangen.li
Citizenship: Chinese

Fields

Research: Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Dynamic Games
Teaching: Microeconomics, Econometrics

Education

Ph.D., Economics, University of Zürich	2016 – 2022 (expected)
M.Sc., Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, <i>Merit</i> , The London School of Economics	2015
B.Sc., Econometrics and Operations Research, <i>Cum laude</i> , Tilburg University	2014
B.Eng., Mechanical Design, Manufacture & Automation, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology	2010

Fellowships & Awards

Excellence Scholarship, Tilburg University	2014
--	------

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant, University of Zürich	
Advanced Microeconomics II (Master)	Spring 2020, 2019
Advanced Microeconomics I (Master)	Fall 2019, 2018
Seminar in Information Economics and Contract Theory (Master)	Fall 2018
Econometrics for Research Students Part I (Ph.D.)	Fall 2017
Thesis Supervision: Bachelor ×1	

Seminar Presentation

Swiss Theory Day 2021	June 2021
-----------------------	-----------

Job Market Paper

“Strategic Exploration for Innovation” <https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.07218>

Abstract: We analyze a game of technology development where players allocate resources between exploration, which continuously expands the public domain of available technologies, and exploitation, which yields a flow payoff by adopting the explored technologies. The qualities of the technologies are correlated and initially unknown, and this uncertainty is fully resolved once the technologies are explored. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with the quality difference between the best available technology and the latest technology under development as the state variable. In all such equilibria, free-rider problem is mitigated by an encouragement effect. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the encouragement effect is dominant if the players are sufficiently patient and the prospect of development is not too poor. Pareto improvements over the symmetric equilibrium can be achieved by asymmetric equilibria where players take turns performing exploration.

Languages

English (fluent), Chinese (native), German (A1.2)

IT Skills

Wolfram Language, Matlab, Julia, R, Python, Java, C, Haskell, Bash, \TeX

References

Professor Marek Pycia
Department of Economics
University of Zürich
Blümlisalpstrasse 10
8006, Zürich
+41 44 634 20 06
marek.pycia@econ.uzh.ch

Professor Armin Schmutzler
Department of Economics
University of Zürich
Blümlisalpstrasse 10
8006, Zürich
+41 44 634 22 71
armin.schmutzler@econ.uzh.ch

Professor Nick Netzer
Department of Economics
University of Zürich
Blümlisalpstrasse 10
8006, Zürich
+41 44 634 06 06
nick.netzer@econ.uzh.ch

Placement Director

Professor Joachim Voth
Department of Economics
University of Zürich
Schönberggasse 1
8001, Zürich
+41 44 634 55 47
voth@econ.uzh.ch